OpenAI [1]announced it's recently banned two "influence operations " — one from Russia and one from Iran — that were using its models "to launder geopolitical, conflict-related messaging" in sophisticated "false front" propaganda campaigns:

> The Iranian operation included a stable of seven "journalist" personas which it used to pitch long-form articles to small and medium online outlets around the world... As well as long-form articles, the Iranian operation generated batches of social media comments, generally on topics related to the US-Iran war... [The Russian operation "appears to have co-opted unwitting people in Latin America to run a 'think tank'.... Since we do not allow access to our models from Russia, they used VPNs to connect to our services."] The Russian operation created fake "leaked" documents and audio scripts, some of which we identified being spread online... Both managed to land their content (not all of which was generated from our models) in mainstream media outlets, rather than simply posting it on social media.

OpenAI says they've exposed 30 covert influence operations using its tools over the last two and a half years. But ironically, in this case both operations "also made heavy use of AI to draft internal reports (the Russian operation did this more than anything else)." And "in both cases, the actors used questionable or outright deceitful methodologies to exaggerate the operators' effectiveness."

> [The Russian operators] claimed that in May 2026, they created a fake email address purporting to come from the Regional Directorate of Education in Lima, Peru. They used this to instruct schools in the district to hold events dedicated to Ukraine on the national Day of Cultural and Linguistic Diversity (May 21)... According to the operators, some schools replied to the fake email address, confirming that they had held such events and even providing pictures. The operators then claimed to have planted stories about the events in the media in both Peru and Poland, alongside allegations that Ukraine was "exporting" ultra-nationalist ideologies, triggering outrage. Open-source searches identified stories that matched this claim in the [2]Peruvianâ [3]andâ [4]Polish [5]pressâ , and an English-language publication in [6]Hungary (some of the articles have since been deleted)...

>

> Similarly, in June, the operators claimed they used a different fake email address to trick schools in Ecuador into holding a ceremony pledging allegiance to President Daniel Noboa and to Erik Prince, former head of private military contractor Blackwater. The operators claimed that the incident provoked outrage in Ecuador and put pressure on the government to deny the fake, thus amplifying it to a nationwide audience. Again, open-source research identified [7]mediaâ [8]coverageâ in the [9]Ecuadorianâ [10]pressâ that closely resembled this claim, and even a [11]detailed rebuttalâ by Ecuador's Minister for Education.

>

> The operators used a range of techniques to underpin their false stories. According to their internal reporting, they spread two different fakes targeting Ecuador in March. One used fake audio attributed to Ukraine's consul in Ecuador, in which he was alleged to have made disparaging comments about Ecuadorians.

OpenAI's report "is the latest illustration of how state actors can easily exploit widely available AI tools to peddle sophisticated propaganda against adversaries on a mass scale," [12]argues the Economic Times :

> "We identified almost 100 articles published or syndicated under the [Iranian] operation's bylines across roughly a dozen online outlets around the world," OpenAI said. "These were small to medium outlets, generally focused on international affairs, geopolitics, and events in the Middle East." The earliest article identified by OpenAI was published in July 2025, and the latest in October 2026, with the frequency of reports increasing after the US-Iran war broke out earlier this year. The operation also generated social media comments on topics related to the US-Iran war, it added.

>

> One of the personas named Ervin B. Hoskins, whose bio claimed to be "an American freelance writer," had social media accounts across tech platforms including Elon Musk's X and Meta-owned Instagram. X's transparency information showed the account was connected via a "West Asia android app" and Instagram's transparency information showed the account was based in Iran, according to screenshots provided by OpenAI. Both accounts appeared to be suspended.



[1] https://openai.com/index/disrupting-ai-enabled-false-front-operations/

[2] https://www.extra.com.pe/actualidad/polemica-en-colegio-de-lima-actividad-sobre-ucrania-pone-en-el-centro-del-debate-a-figuras-historicas-noticia/

[3] https://trome.com/actualidad/nacional/ucrania-acerca-su-historia-a-estudiantes-en-peru-embajada-noticia/

[4] https://myslpolska.info/2026/07/02/piskorski-zelenski-jako-kontynuator-bandery/

[5] https://i.pl/petlura-bandera-i-zelenski-w-peru-jak-ukrainski-nacjonalizm-rozprzestrzenil-sie-za-ocean/ar/c1p2-29161355

[6] https://web.archive.org/web/20260705015147/https://dailynewshungary.com/how-portraits-of-bandera-and-zelenskyy/

[7] https://www.ecuavisa.com/amp/sociedad/cuenta-falsa-educacion-lealtad-daniel-noboa-erik-prince-escuelas-20260616-0105.html

[8] https://www.primicias.ec/sociedad/ministerio-educacion-juramento-escolar-correos-falsos-profesores-denuncia-video-125589/

[9] https://ecuadorchequea.com/lo-que-sabemos-y-lo-que-no-sobre-juramento-a-noboa-en-las-escuelas-de-quito-y-guayaquil/

[10] https://www.expreso.ec/politica/desmienten-video-ninos-haciendo-juramento-daniel-noboa-erik-prince-286024.html

[11] https://x.com/GildaAlcivarOk/status/2067034085021676030

[12] https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/tech/artificial-intelligence/openai-says-iran-russia-influence-ops-busted/articleshow/134804673.cms?from=mdr