Is Europe Better Prepared to Protect Undersea Internet Cables? (carnegieendowment.org)
(Thursday December 05, 2024 @11:34AM (EditorDavid)
from the net-loss dept.)
- Reference: 0175596883
- News link: https://tech.slashdot.org/story/24/12/05/0521225/is-europe-better-prepared-to-protect-undersea-internet-cables
- Source link: https://carnegieendowment.org/emissary/2024/12/baltic-sea-internet-cable-cut-europe-nato-security?lang=en
The Carnegie Endowment for Peace, a nonpartisan international affairs think tank, points out that when subsea internet cables were cut in November, [1]Europe was more prepared :
> Where in the past there were no contingency plans for sabotage, there are now [2]more maritime patrols , an attempt to [3]forge deeper intelligence connections , and the beginnings of a [4]new relationship with the private sector ...
>
> Even before the October 2023 incident, NATO, the EU, and certain European governments began to increase their efforts to boost subsea cable resilience and security. In February 2023, NATO [5]stood up a new Critical Undersea Infrastructure Coordination Cell in Brussels to convene stakeholders and enhance coordination between the public and private sectors. In July 2023, NATO allies at the Vilnius Summit [6]established a Maritime Center for the Security of Critical Undersea Infrastructure as part of the alliance's Maritime Command in Northwood, UK. In October 2023, after the first incident, NATO defense ministers [7]endorsed a new Digital Ocean Vision, an initiative aimed at improving undersea surveillance. And in February 2024, the European Commission [8]released its first "Recommendation on Secure and Resilient Submarine Cable Infrastructures," encouraging member states to conduct regular stress tests, improve information sharing amongst themselves, and improve cable maintenance and repair capabilities.
The article points out that the Chinese ship suspected in the 2023 cable cutting "ignored requests from [9]Finnish and [10]Estonian authorities to halt" and returned to China. But the Chinese ship suspected in November's cable-cutting "remains in international waters in the Kattegat, with naval and coast guard vessels from [11]Denmark , [12]Germany , and [13]Sweden circling close by." Yet "Under international maritime law, these countries' authorities are not allowed to board..."
> Current provisions of international law are neither formulated to adequately protect subsea data cables from sabotage nor hold perpetrators accountable. This reality should lead the EU, as a body inherently focused on the resilience of international legal regimes, to push for updates that are better suited for the current geopolitical reality... Lawmakers should also explore ways to increase penalties for subsea cable damage, in part to deter acts of sabotage in the first place....
>
> A forthcoming Carnegie Endowment report will detail more in-depth recommendations on how Europe can both protect itself against future subsea cable damage and help expand trusted networks around the world.
The article also notes that "Of the hundreds of disruptions to cables that [14]occur each year, the vast majority are caused by accidental human activity, like fishing, or natural events, like earthquakes."
[1] https://carnegieendowment.org/emissary/2024/12/baltic-sea-internet-cable-cut-europe-nato-security?lang=en
[2] https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/news_219500.htm
[3] https://foreignpolicy.com/2024/06/24/nato-undersea-cable-network-russia-infrastructure-defense/
[4] https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/news_214322.htm?selectedLocale=en
[5] https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/news_211919.htm
[6] https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/official_texts_217320.htm
[7] https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/news_219441.htm
[8] https://digital-strategy.ec.europa.eu/en/library/recommendation-security-and-resilience-submarine-cable-infrastructures
[9] https://poliisi.fi/en/-/national-bureau-of-investigation-has-clarified-technically-the-cause-of-gas-pipeline-damage
[10] https://news.err.ee/1609470556/new-balticconnector-pipeline-damage-facts-come-to-light
[11] https://x.com/forsvaretdk/status/1859195509866381402
[12] https://gcaptain.com/german-and-swedish-coast-guards-arrive-near-yi-peng-3-in-escalating-cable-damage-incident/
[13] https://gcaptain.com/german-and-swedish-coast-guards-arrive-near-yi-peng-3-in-escalating-cable-damage-incident/
[14] https://www.businesswire.com/news/home/20240227617128/en/Message-from-the-International-Cable-Protection-Committee-Recent-Events-Involving-Submarine-Cables-in-the-Red-Sea
> Where in the past there were no contingency plans for sabotage, there are now [2]more maritime patrols , an attempt to [3]forge deeper intelligence connections , and the beginnings of a [4]new relationship with the private sector ...
>
> Even before the October 2023 incident, NATO, the EU, and certain European governments began to increase their efforts to boost subsea cable resilience and security. In February 2023, NATO [5]stood up a new Critical Undersea Infrastructure Coordination Cell in Brussels to convene stakeholders and enhance coordination between the public and private sectors. In July 2023, NATO allies at the Vilnius Summit [6]established a Maritime Center for the Security of Critical Undersea Infrastructure as part of the alliance's Maritime Command in Northwood, UK. In October 2023, after the first incident, NATO defense ministers [7]endorsed a new Digital Ocean Vision, an initiative aimed at improving undersea surveillance. And in February 2024, the European Commission [8]released its first "Recommendation on Secure and Resilient Submarine Cable Infrastructures," encouraging member states to conduct regular stress tests, improve information sharing amongst themselves, and improve cable maintenance and repair capabilities.
The article points out that the Chinese ship suspected in the 2023 cable cutting "ignored requests from [9]Finnish and [10]Estonian authorities to halt" and returned to China. But the Chinese ship suspected in November's cable-cutting "remains in international waters in the Kattegat, with naval and coast guard vessels from [11]Denmark , [12]Germany , and [13]Sweden circling close by." Yet "Under international maritime law, these countries' authorities are not allowed to board..."
> Current provisions of international law are neither formulated to adequately protect subsea data cables from sabotage nor hold perpetrators accountable. This reality should lead the EU, as a body inherently focused on the resilience of international legal regimes, to push for updates that are better suited for the current geopolitical reality... Lawmakers should also explore ways to increase penalties for subsea cable damage, in part to deter acts of sabotage in the first place....
>
> A forthcoming Carnegie Endowment report will detail more in-depth recommendations on how Europe can both protect itself against future subsea cable damage and help expand trusted networks around the world.
The article also notes that "Of the hundreds of disruptions to cables that [14]occur each year, the vast majority are caused by accidental human activity, like fishing, or natural events, like earthquakes."
[1] https://carnegieendowment.org/emissary/2024/12/baltic-sea-internet-cable-cut-europe-nato-security?lang=en
[2] https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/news_219500.htm
[3] https://foreignpolicy.com/2024/06/24/nato-undersea-cable-network-russia-infrastructure-defense/
[4] https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/news_214322.htm?selectedLocale=en
[5] https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/news_211919.htm
[6] https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/official_texts_217320.htm
[7] https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/news_219441.htm
[8] https://digital-strategy.ec.europa.eu/en/library/recommendation-security-and-resilience-submarine-cable-infrastructures
[9] https://poliisi.fi/en/-/national-bureau-of-investigation-has-clarified-technically-the-cause-of-gas-pipeline-damage
[10] https://news.err.ee/1609470556/new-balticconnector-pipeline-damage-facts-come-to-light
[11] https://x.com/forsvaretdk/status/1859195509866381402
[12] https://gcaptain.com/german-and-swedish-coast-guards-arrive-near-yi-peng-3-in-escalating-cable-damage-incident/
[13] https://gcaptain.com/german-and-swedish-coast-guards-arrive-near-yi-peng-3-in-escalating-cable-damage-incident/
[14] https://www.businesswire.com/news/home/20240227617128/en/Message-from-the-International-Cable-Protection-Committee-Recent-Events-Involving-Submarine-Cables-in-the-Red-Sea
Are they better prepared to protect it.. (Score:2)
by Rujiel ( 1632063 )
..than they were to protect nord stream from getting destroyed by the US?
Obviously (Score:2)
by Phaid ( 938 )
not, seeing as how the Chinese cut a cable in November the exact same way they did last year.
Nothing says WW3 is coming (Score:2)
more than "Is Europe prepared to protect its undersea internet cables".
As a former wide-eyed hopeful child of the 70's, I say fuck this world.