News: 1680100089

  ARM Give a man a fire and he's warm for a day, but set fire to him and he's warm for the rest of his life (Terry Pratchett, Jingo)

EU mandated messaging platform love-in is easier said than done: Cambridge boffins

(2023/03/29)


By March 2024, instant messaging and real-time media apps operated by large tech platforms in Europe will be required to communicate with other services, per the EU's Digital Markets Act (DMA).

How that will happen remains an unresolved technical and social challenge.

In a [1]preprint paper , "One Protocol to Rule Them All? On Securing Interoperable Messaging," University of Cambridge doctoral candidate Jenny Blessing and security engineering professor Ross Anderson observe that the DMA is now law in Europe and messaging gatekeepers will need to comply, though it won't be easy.

[2]

"Designing a system capable of securely encrypting and decrypting messages and associated data across different service providers raises many thorny questions and practical implementation compromises," they say in their paper.

[3]

[4]

An [5]EU interoperability workshop held earlier this month explored these issues and there too, participants acknowledged that [6]interoperability is hard .

According to Blessing and Anderson, making encrypted end-to-end communication services interoperable will require novel protocols and processes, both technical and social, in order to be simultaneously secure and usable.

[7]

"Interoperability doesn't just mean co-opting existing cryptographic protocols so that one service provider can pass messages along to another – it encompasses the many supporting features and protocols that make up contemporary E2EE applications," the boffins argue.

"The resulting complexity of the system may inherently compromise the level of security due to the increased number of moving parts, just as key escrow mechanisms endanger cryptography even if the escrow keys are kept perfectly secure."

The DMA, they observe, calls for interoperating services to maintain security, but that's complicated. It's not just the end-to-end key exchange protocol in an encrypted comms app. A service may rely on a proprietary E2EE protocol that doesn't support forward secrecy (used to safeguard past messages) or doesn't rotate keys regularly. What constitutes grounds for refusing to interoperate?

[8]

Then there are the non-technical issues – how services cooperate with one another to tackle spam and abuse, how they deal with vulnerabilities and outages. Interoperability, the researchers argue, represents a dramatic expansion of the trust surface for messaging users, who now have to consider the practices and policies of gatekeeper partners.

Interoperability goal makes security more complex

Blessing and Anderson say there are two broad ways to approach message platform interoperability, a common protocol or platform-based open APIs for third-party connectivity.

Leading contenders for a common protocol include Matrix, Signal, and the IETF's MLS (Messaging Layer Security), the two computer scientists say. But variations in implementation – Signal, WhatsApp, Viber, Facebook Messenger, and others rely on different versions of the Signal protocol – make standardization difficult.

Given concerns that innovation is easier with a centralized, unfederated protocol than a federated, distributed scheme, Blessing and Anderson see platform API bridges as the more likely scenario, at least in the short term. Under this scenario, platforms would maintain their own E2EE protocols and offer a client-side interface for other messaging services to connect over a bridge.

But this approach also has challenges because gatekeepers – large platform providers – would need to create bridges for each different message provider and, as the boffins observe, this has security implications.

What's more, these APIs can't be entirely open due to the sensitive nature of the messages being handled. "Service providers will need a fair amount of latitude in their ability to deny access requests to continue to guard against malicious data scraping and mining, regardless of whether interoperable [messaging] is implemented through client-side bridging or an open standard," the researchers argue.

[9]Open Source Policy Summit: Where FOSS and government meet

[10]Chat among yourselves: New EU law may force the big IM platforms to open up

[11]When cookie spewers single you out, it IS personal, barks watchdog

[12]Some FOSS gems: Franz, RamBox, Pidgin and more

Blessing and Anderson step though the many technical hurdles and cite the difficulties Meta had beginning WhatsApp and Facebook Messenger together as a harbinger of the difficulties awaiting those carrying out the EU's interoperability mandate.

But it's the social obstacles that may prove harder to solve, they suggest, noting that some users so despise Meta that they won't use WhatsApp and ask friends to use Signal while others, such as those in Ukraine, consider Telegram to be a tool of the Russian government.

"Interoperability without robust moderation and interface design to make platforms pleasant to use is a nonstarter," the pair conclude. "Giving users a choice between platforms without giving them a platform they would want to spend time on is no choice at all." ®

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[1] https://arxiv.org/abs/2303.14178

[2] https://pubads.g.doubleclick.net/gampad/jump?co=1&iu=/6978/reg_security/front&sz=300x50%7C300x100%7C300x250%7C300x251%7C300x252%7C300x600%7C300x601&tile=2&c=2ZCRgnkt9CyeM2TkYpUy3JQAAAMs&t=ct%3Dns%26unitnum%3D2%26raptor%3Dcondor%26pos%3Dtop%26test%3D0

[3] https://pubads.g.doubleclick.net/gampad/jump?co=1&iu=/6978/reg_security/front&sz=300x50%7C300x100%7C300x250%7C300x251%7C300x252%7C300x600%7C300x601&tile=4&c=44ZCRgnkt9CyeM2TkYpUy3JQAAAMs&t=ct%3Dns%26unitnum%3D4%26raptor%3Dfalcon%26pos%3Dmid%26test%3D0

[4] https://pubads.g.doubleclick.net/gampad/jump?co=1&iu=/6978/reg_security/front&sz=300x50%7C300x100%7C300x250%7C300x251%7C300x252%7C300x600%7C300x601&tile=3&c=33ZCRgnkt9CyeM2TkYpUy3JQAAAMs&t=ct%3Dns%26unitnum%3D3%26raptor%3Deagle%26pos%3Dmid%26test%3D0

[5] https://competition-policy.ec.europa.eu/dma/dma-workshops/interoperability-workshop_en

[6] https://educatedguesswork.org/posts/dma-interop/#interoperability-is-hard

[7] https://pubads.g.doubleclick.net/gampad/jump?co=1&iu=/6978/reg_security/front&sz=300x50%7C300x100%7C300x250%7C300x251%7C300x252%7C300x600%7C300x601&tile=4&c=44ZCRgnkt9CyeM2TkYpUy3JQAAAMs&t=ct%3Dns%26unitnum%3D4%26raptor%3Dfalcon%26pos%3Dmid%26test%3D0

[8] https://pubads.g.doubleclick.net/gampad/jump?co=1&iu=/6978/reg_security/front&sz=300x50%7C300x100%7C300x250%7C300x251%7C300x252%7C300x600%7C300x601&tile=3&c=33ZCRgnkt9CyeM2TkYpUy3JQAAAMs&t=ct%3Dns%26unitnum%3D3%26raptor%3Deagle%26pos%3Dmid%26test%3D0

[9] https://www.theregister.com/2023/02/09/open_source_policy_summit/

[10] https://www.theregister.com/2021/11/26/eu_digital_markets_act/

[11] https://www.theregister.com/2012/10/16/when_is_a_cookie_personal_data/

[12] https://www.theregister.com/2021/11/19/friday_foss_fest/

[13] https://whitepapers.theregister.com/



Just one back door required.

TimMaher

Should make things a lot easier for the roz and spy agencies then.

Someone...

DailyLlama

hasn't read the other post about boffins today!

https://www.theregister.com/2023/03/29/scientists_boffins/

Re: Someone...

snowpages

As one of the boffins was female, I would think that they deliberately chose that word (twice).

What a load of bollox

Anonymous Coward

I read this with brave on android, but I could have used Firefox on my Linux pc and if I were a lemming, edge on windows. I can pick up my voip phone and call anybody. Anyone using a protocol standard can talk, but corporations want interoperability to fail , get vendor lock in, mine all the data they can from thier "secure" platforms and exploit their cash cows to enable purchase of garbage reports like this one.

All they need to do is use a genuinely secure standard and compete on their interfaces.

Doctor Syntax

Legislators really need to commission a proof of concept before legislating.

mark l 2

Well interoperable messages sound good on paper, as the article mentions some users specifically avoid using certain platforms because of who runs them, and having Whatsapp users able to send and receive messages to people on Signal or Telegram means that Zuckerberg is able to suck up information from users on other platforms without their express permission being needed.

Also how will it handle connecting to platforms where the phone number is not required, such as Snapchat where you can create accounts with just an email address?

TheMaskedMan

I'm not totally clear on what problem this is supposed to solve. If you want to message someone on telegram, use telegram. If you want to message someone on WhatsApp, use that.

As the paper suggests, folks using telegram / signal etc likely do so because they don't want to use WhatsApp or messenger, either because they can't abide Facebook / meta, or don't trust the apps. Why open gateways to services they don't want to use? And will they be able to decline those gateways if they wish.

Misdirection.....If Signal Has A Backdoor (!!)....Then Citizens Can Fend For Themselves!!

Anonymous Coward

Quote: "...doesn't rotate keys regularly..."

Quote: "...Designing a system capable of securely encrypting and decrypting messages and associated data across different service providers raises many thorny questions..."

Quote: "...others rely on different versions of the Signal protocol...."

Yup...rotate keys...

Yup...thorny questions...

Yup...Signal protocol...

All this is just serious misdirection. Citizen groups who want privacy and security for their messaging will ignore this tittle-tattle.......

.....and they will avoid all the backdoors in Signal, Telegram, WhatsApp...........

.....by implementing private encryption on a point-to-point basis....their ONLY encryption/decryption will be done ONLY on their own end point devices!!

That way, Gmail will be a perfectly secure transport. Of course, if they choose to send private encrypted messages over Signal....so what....the spooks will use the Signal backdoor, and will just read.....private encryption!!

And on the subject of keys.....who says that keys need to be persistent....who says keys need to be published?

Well.....since the Diffie/Hellman findings in 1976, it turns out that keys can be randomly assigned to every message....calculated as needed....never published...and thrown away after use.

........why would anyone need to "rotate keys"? Did I mention misdirection?

The El Reg needs to publish more informative stuff about privacy and security. But if commentards want to read up:

(1) Applied Cryptograpy, Steve Schneier (Diffie/Hellman, Chapter 22.1)

(2) Cryptography Engineering, Ferguson/Schneier/Kohno (Diffie/Hellman, Chapter 11)

(3) Daniel J. Bernstein, multiple resources

I suspect what is really meant is ...

Anonymous Coward

we want to be able to read all your messages ... however if we admitted that we'd never get the public onside. So by calling it "digital interoperability" we can disguise it as being good for citizens.

Does the same as the system call of that name.
If you don't know what it does, don't worry about it.
-- Larry Wall in the perl man page regarding chroot(2)