UK Telecommunications Act – aka 'power to strip out Huawei' – makes it to the statute book
- Reference: 1637250382
- News link: https://www.theregister.co.uk/2021/11/18/dcms_tca/
- Source link:
In case readers are in any doubt who one of those "high risk" vendors is, the statement from the department was titled "Government enshrines in law power to strip out Huawei."
The [1]banhammer was dropped on Huawei's 5G kit last year. The Shenzhen-based company's hardware must be eradicated from UK mobile networks by 2027.
[2]
Having got the nod from Her Maj, the 2021 Telecommunications Act ramps things up somewhat. Companies that don't follow directions on those pesky high-risk vendors could be fined up to 10 per cent of their turnover or £100k per day. The rules were floated [3]last year and getting the Act on the statute books means the government can make regulations via [4]secondary legislation .
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While the Department of Digital, Culture, Media and Sport (DCMS) did not shy from naming Huawei in its release, [7]the law itself does not specify companies by name. Instead it is concerned with bumping up the security of telecom networks rather than just leaving it to operators to set their own standards.
However, sections such as the "Designated Vendor Directions" give the Secretary of State a range of powers to slap down the use of specific vendors for a number of reasons, including "the interests of national security."
[8]China Telecom's US arm sues in last-ditch bid to retain license
[9]There's no Huawei back now: Biden signs law that forbids US buyers acquiring kit on naughty list
[10]Huawei reportedly set to salvage honor with sale of server x86 business
[11]FCC officially opens its $1.9bn purse to reimburse those ripping out and replacing Huawei, ZTE kit
Regulator Ofcom has the task of monitoring and assessing the security of telecoms providers. It will also be able to visit operators' premises in person to conduct on-site inspections.
An Ofcom spokesperson told The Register : "We rely on the internet and our phones for so much of our lives now. So it's vital the networks that provide those services are secure and resilient. These new powers will help us hold telecoms firms to account – making sure they are doing everything they can to protect their networks and the people who use them."
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As for what the law actually means, Julia Lopez, minister for Media, Data and Digital Infrastructure, described it as a "major step forward," adding: "Risks to our telecoms networks can never be completely prevented, but we have raised security standards across the board."
DCMS, also known and loved by some as " [13]The Ministry of Fun " (because it's the department for Culture, Media and Sport), listed some of the possible requirements for telecoms providers from government:
Securely design, build and maintain sensitive equipment in the core of their networks which controls how they are managed
Reduce the risks that equipment supplied by third parties in the telecoms supply chain is unreliable or could be used to facilitate cyber attacks
Carefully control who has permission to access sensitive core network equipment on site as well as the software that manages networks
Make sure they are able to carry out security audits and put governance in place to understand the risks facing their public networks and services
Keep networks running for customers and free from interference, while ensuring confidential customer data is protected when it is sent between different parts of the network
For its part, Huawei has always unsurprisingly denied it is a stooge for the Chinese Communist Party; has worked annually with the Huawei Cyber Security Evaluation Centre (HCSEC), an offshoot of the UK's National Cyber Security Centre, which repeatedly found some [14]crappy coding practices but no security backdoors; and has operated in Britain for years before the UK government was [15]strong-armed by US politicos .
The Register contacted Huawei for its thoughts and will update when the company responds. ®
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[1] https://www.theregister.com/2020/07/14/huawei_ban_uk/
[2] https://pubads.g.doubleclick.net/gampad/jump?co=1&iu=/6978/reg_onprem/networks&sz=300x50%7C300x100%7C300x250%7C300x251%7C300x252%7C300x600%7C300x601&tile=2&c=2YZaGwu2EG3DmMsEDohcbhgAAABY&t=ct%3Dns%26unitnum%3D2%26raptor%3Dcondor%26pos%3Dtop%26test%3D0
[3] https://www.theregister.com/2020/11/24/telecommunications_security_bill/
[4] https://www.parliament.uk/about/how/laws/secondary-legislation/
[5] https://pubads.g.doubleclick.net/gampad/jump?co=1&iu=/6978/reg_onprem/networks&sz=300x50%7C300x100%7C300x250%7C300x251%7C300x252%7C300x600%7C300x601&tile=4&c=44YZaGwu2EG3DmMsEDohcbhgAAABY&t=ct%3Dns%26unitnum%3D4%26raptor%3Dfalcon%26pos%3Dmid%26test%3D0
[6] https://pubads.g.doubleclick.net/gampad/jump?co=1&iu=/6978/reg_onprem/networks&sz=300x50%7C300x100%7C300x250%7C300x251%7C300x252%7C300x600%7C300x601&tile=3&c=33YZaGwu2EG3DmMsEDohcbhgAAABY&t=ct%3Dns%26unitnum%3D3%26raptor%3Deagle%26pos%3Dmid%26test%3D0
[7] https://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2021/31/introduction/enacted
[8] https://www.theregister.com/2021/11/16/china_telecom_us_emergency_lawsuit/
[9] https://www.theregister.com/2021/11/12/biden_signs_the_secure_equipment/
[10] https://www.theregister.com/2021/11/03/huawei_x86_server_sale_rumoured/
[11] https://www.theregister.com/2021/11/01/fcc_huawei_replace/
[12] https://pubads.g.doubleclick.net/gampad/jump?co=1&iu=/6978/reg_onprem/networks&sz=300x50%7C300x100%7C300x250%7C300x251%7C300x252%7C300x600%7C300x601&tile=4&c=44YZaGwu2EG3DmMsEDohcbhgAAABY&t=ct%3Dns%26unitnum%3D4%26raptor%3Dfalcon%26pos%3Dmid%26test%3D0
[13] https://dcmsblog.uk/2013/11/serious-business-at-the-ministry-of-fun/
[14] https://www.theregister.com/2020/10/01/huawei_uk_security_code_review_panel/
[15] https://www.theregister.com/2019/05/09/pompeo_invokes_thatcher_huawei_5g_security/
[16] https://whitepapers.theregister.com/
Re: Huawei has always unsurprisingly denied it is a stooge for the Chinese Communist Party
"probable that the code and practices of other vendors are just as bad - they just haven't had such a bright spotlight turned on them."
It's not just the quality consideration. Without being able to inspect the code it's possible backdoors could be hidden in there in the way they can't by Huawei
It's the apparent "better the devil you don't know" approach I find worrying. It leads on to the wondering whether it's stupidity or whether the backdoors do exist and are left ajar for the TLAs.
Communism bad
Instead the government mandates that you buy from state approved vendors and suggests that ideally people build their own telecoms equipment rather than from commercial outfits that may have ulterior motives.
This comes after the nationalise the railways
Perhaps we could revitalise the British Steel industry with backyard furnaces?
Come, Join Chairman Boris' great leap forward(*) !
(* actual direction of leap not guaranteed)
Re: Communism bad
I don't think you have to nationalise anything if the private companies act with integrity. Sadly, the privatisation has lead to companies being more interested in the board members and investors, than the customers.
In addition, shouldn't tariffs be applied to create a level playing field ?
Is it possible that operators went for the cheapest equipment, such that local (Europe) manufacturers were at a distinct disadvantage. There is an immediate bottom line benefit, but many years later the "local" manufacturers are now nearly out of business (Marconi ??), and hence we (the west) lose vital advantages and knowledge/capability ?
This does seem to be the western governments failing in their duty to ensure that the home market continues to thrive and is protected from undercutting etc.
Re: Communism bad
"if the private companies act with integrity"
Re: Communism bad
> the privatisation has lead to companies being more interested in .... investors, than the customers.
That is literally the directors legal duty
Meanwhile, at Cisco's lobbyists...
"Trebles all round! And someone post that Ian Duncan Smith a crate of our finest American Champagne. And a baseball hat, I hear those bald english politicians go wild for them.... what? England. ENGLAND. No I don't know either."
There has been zero proof that any kit from China is dodgy and lets be realistic why take the risk with your billion pound industry?
This is just another example of us doing what the American machine says like a lap dog. Are other countries banning the kit? If it's such a risk they would be banned all over the world. Over time we are going to fall back technologically with nationalistic strategies like this, it's not like we have a world class educational system to produce the people to take us forward.
What do you expect
when we have an American Prime minister. (And let's not forget the leader of the Labour Party is a "Sir"). There is no hope left is there...
And then there is this,
"As for what the law actually means, Julia Lopez, minister for Media, Data and Digital Infrastructure, described it as a "major step forward," adding: "Risks to our telecoms networks can never be completely prevented, but we have raised security standards across the board."
It will also raise consumer's prices you stupid cow. Less competition, get it? And why don't you "raise security standards" against the known "backdoor" provider Cisco? Is it because you couldn't possibly go against our American "friends" who are pulling our American puppet bosses strings?
Huawei has always unsurprisingly denied it is a stooge for the Chinese Communist Party
However, successive annual reports from the UK Huawei Cyber Security Evaluation Centre have shown that their code quality and engineering practice have been crap for years. Even [1]the latest report states " there has been no overall improvement over the course of 2020 to meet the product software engineering and cyber security quality expected by the NCSC ."
Of course it's possible probable that the code and practices of other vendors are just as bad - they just haven't had such a bright spotlight turned on them.
[1] https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/1004291/2021_HCSEC_OB_REPORT_FINAL__1_.pdf