Proposed US fix for Boeing 737 Max software woes does not address Ethiopian crash scenario, UK pilot union warns
- Reference: 1600855329
- News link: https://www.theregister.co.uk/2020/09/23/boeing_737_max_faa_balpa/
- Source link:
Airlines, in contrast, are broadly happy with proposed changes to the Boeing 737 Max, even as trade unions bellow at the US Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) that more needs to be done.
In [3]public comments submitted to the FAA's notice of proposed rulemaking (NPRM), BALPA warned that one of the proposed workarounds for a future MCAS failure could lead to a repeat of [4]the crash of Ethiopian Airlines flight ET302 .
MCAS – Manoeuvring Characteristics Augmentation System – is a software system intended to counteract the effect of hanging bigger and more powerful engines off the Boeing 737 airframe. The new engines gave the airliner different flying characteristics from previous models. With Boeing relying on regulators certifying the 737 Max as an incremental advance rather than a whole new design, MCAS was necessary to get it through FAA certification without regulators imposing expensive training requirements on the new aircraft before pilots could fly it.
The NPRM, published [5]here , proposes various fixes to the 737 Max design, its software and procedures for pilots to follow in the event of a problem. One of those procedures includes disabling the airliner's automatic trim system, operated by MCAS when the software kicks in, and having the two pilots use a manual backup trim wheel instead of the aircraft's powerful electric motors.
BALPA said: "Requiring both crew members to turn the trim wheel simultaneously in a non-normal scenario is extremely undesirable and goes against all philosophies of having one pilot fly and one run the QRH [quick reference handbook: reading out the emergency checklist] . No flight control system should require both pilots to operate it at any stage, let alone in an emergency."
The trade union added: "It is felt that this should be reconsidered (particularly in light of the smaller diameter trim wheel as fitted to the MAX to enable the new larger screens to fit, and as per the scenario observed in the Ethiopian Airlines accident).
ET302 crashed after its pilots, who were fully aware of MCAS after the earlier crash of Lion Air flight 610 (the first 737 Max crash), tried without success to override the flawed software system. MCAS works by automatically trimming the 737 Max's nose downwards if it senses that the aircraft is about to stall, a dangerous condition that normally comes about when the nose is pointing too high and the speed is too low. In ET302's case that MCAS activation was false, however.
Its pilots disabled electric trim motors that had been activated by MCAS and, [6]crash investigators believed , tried to use the manual trim wheel in the cockpit to physically undo what the software had done – following Boeing procedures published after the Lion Air crash. Thanks to the aircraft's excessive speed, built up as MCAS forced its nose to point downwards at the ground, the pilots were unsuccessful. Aerodynamic forces on the control surfaces made it impossible for them to rotate the trim wheel and point the airliner's nose back at the sky.
Meanwhile, back with the FAA's NPRM, the Joint European Max Operators' Group, which includes Ryanair, Norwegian, and Tui, among other airlines, [7]made some minor suggestions for textual edits while reassuring the FAA that they "are not intended to impact on the planned RTS [return to service] programme" for the 737 Max. Some airlines believe all will be well when their Maxes are allowed to fly again. ®
Bootnote
The 737 Max will be known as the 737-7, 737-8 and 737-9. In Ryanair's case it will be known as the 737-8200, a reference to the base -8 Max model having been fettled to fit 200 seats rather than the stock -8's 180ish.
International Air Transport Association aeroplane type codes will be B37M, B38M and B39M should you want to avoid booking a flight on one.
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[1] https://www.theregister.com/2020/01/15/boeing_sales_slump_after_737_max_omnishambles/
[2] https://www.theregister.com/2019/05/20/737_max_flight_simulators_not_accurate_report/
[3] https://beta.regulations.gov/comment/FAA-2020-0686-0152
[4] https://www.theregister.com/2019/03/11/china_boeing_737/
[5] https://beta.regulations.gov/docket/FAA-2020-0686/document
[6] https://www.theregister.com/2019/04/04/737_max_ethiopia_press_conference_pilots_followed_boeing_procedures/
[7] https://beta.regulations.gov/comment/FAA-2020-0686-0128
[8] https://whitepapers.theregister.com/
The high powered business types talk a lot about how they need to be paid so much money because they take risks and face consequences, right?
This would be "consequences".
the old change the name in the hope that people will forget and not notice ploy
one could just imagine the board meeting
Baldrick "I have a cunning plan to allow us to return the planes to the sky"
CEO Blackadder, visibly disgusted "Yes Baldrick, go on then, tell us your brilliant idea..."
Why
Could they not make it so you could disable MCAS but leave the electrical trim actuators available for the pilots to use to trim the plane?
Re: Why
>>>Requiring both crew members to turn the trim wheel simultaneously<<<
So neither pilot can be allowed to leave the front seats at any time during a flight on safety grounds.
The obvious answer to this is have a third pilot in the cockpit, that'll put a hole in the improved running costs and make the cockpit a bit snug.
Re: Why
You know, and this is just an off the cuff idea, why don't we call him a Flight Engineer and place his seat just behind the other two?
Re: Why
Well the idea was that the aircraft wouldn't need pilot recertification, which this definitely would.
Re: Why
They could, but that would have been a significant change to the training, i.e. you couldn't just do a quick iPad session and be signed off to fly the Max based on previous 737 experience. I'm not sure how that's changed now but I'd imagine adding an extra switch would require more certification work delaying re-entry to service further.
Fundamentally flawed
This derivation of the 737 airframe is fundamentally flawed. No amount of software, or extended training for pilots will fix it. Boeing have to accept that fact. The FAA will have to accept that fact. Every other aviation authority should do the same - ban it from the sky before it causes another tragedy.
Who had the fish?
"Requiring both crew members to operate the trim wheel"
That would be funny if it wasn't so serious.
How could anyone suggest that as a fix and expect to be taken seriously?
Boeing created a flawed aircraft in the face of superior competition, so i an attempt to regain sales against a more economical aircraft tried a quick and obviously dange fix but are unwilling to face up to the fact they screwed up.
As for Ryan Air, don't you just love that they just wanted a better explanation in the pilot's book while adding 20 more arses to the potential casualty list.
But hey let's care about the profit firstthen worry about the arses.
Is it safe?
(apologies for Marathon Man reference)
I am worried that the BALPA objections are about what to do when the MCAS system goes rogue again. The trim wheel is too small, both pilots needed to turn it etc.
Surely the whole point of the MAX fleet grounding and the year or more of changes was to stop MCAS going wrong. This seems to me to be an acceptance that it WILL go wrong and what to do when once again the pilots have to battle a rogue system.
Maybe they should have got Microsoft to develop it. They know all about crashes. Just fit three new keys on the instrument panel (Ctrl-Alt-Del).
In answer to my own question; no, it isn't safe.
Re: Is it safe?
Aviation teaches you to be cynical, better to assume a system is going to go wrong and train for it, rather than assuming the designers are infallible.
What might be harder to ignore...
... is the House Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure (i.e. the Congressional Committee) report here:
https://transportation.house.gov/imo/media/doc/2020.09.15%20FINAL%20737%20MAX%20Report%20for%20Public%20Release.pdf
(Warning; there's a lot of it...)
There was mention in the UK press about this last week, and I had been hoping that El Reg would draw it to our attention here. It must make uncomfortable reading for both Boeing and the FAA.
Re: What might be harder to ignore...
Thanks for this link. I'm only on the executive summary, but Christ, what a shitshow for Boeing and the FAA.
Re: What might be harder to ignore...
"By Majority Staff Of The Committee On Transportation And Infrastructure"
"This report was produced by Democratic staff of the Committee"
Oh god, like everything else in America it's polarised. I wonder what would happen if a Democrat and a Republican were required to turn the trim wheels in a plummeting 737 MAX at the same time.
They do not
give a fuck about passengers lives do they.
Time to kill Boeing
Cheers… Ishy
Requiring both crew members to turn the trim wheel simultaneously
Because the only time the manual trim wheel can be used by any member of the cockpit crew is when the plane is on the ground .
When the plane is in the air, due to resistance of the air, it is impossible to turn the trim wheel.
Hard to believe Boeing are still trying to "cheat the system" and get unsafe planes back in the air.
These planes need to all be recalled and scrapped, and never flown again.