Campaign groups warn GCHQ can re-identify UK's phones from COVID-19 contact-tracing app data
- Reference: 1590074106
- News link: https://www.theregister.co.uk/2020/05/21/gchq_contact_tracing_spying/
- Source link:
In an [1]open letter to Prime Minister Boris Johnson [PDF] , the groups say the current proposal for the app risk a drift toward a surveillance state. Groups who signed the missive include tech justice nonprofit Foxglove and digital rights campaigners Access Now.
NHS contact tracing app isn't really anonymous, is riddled with bugs, and is open to abuse. Good thing we're not in the middle of a pandemic, eh? [2]READ MORE
The existing legal framework for the app, currently being [3]trialled on the Isle of Wight , is inadequate to protect people from misuse of their data, as noted by the Joint Committee on Human Rights.
“Parliament has to quickly issue an adequate legal framework that guarantees users’ human rights protection,” argued the letter, also signed by Paul Bernal, associate professor of IT, IP and media Law at UEA Law School and Andy Phippen, Professor of Digital Rights at Bournemouth University.
The groups echo warnings about the use of a centralised model for the collection, processing and storage of users’ data. “The centralised recording of data could facilitate mission creep; there is no guarantee that the Government will not add additional tracking features or later use the data for purposes other than COVID-19 tracking. Of particular concern is the fact that the National Cyber Security Centre and GCHQ will have the capacity to (re)identify the phones of people who have installed the app. Based on the UK Government’s track record on surveillance, we consider these risks to be real,” the letter said.
Meanwhile, the campaigners warn of over-reach in another government plan: to combat COVID-19 fake-news. In March, Department for Digital, Culture, Media and Sport launched a " [4]Counter Disinformation Cell " aimed at combating "false and misleading narratives."
The campaigners' letter claims the Rapid Response Unit, which operated from within the Cabinet Office and No10 since April 2018, is currently supporting the work of the Counter Disinformation Cell. That includes work with social media platforms to remove "harmful content."
It might not be a good idea for tinfoil hat wearing conspiracy theorists spouting nonsense about links between [5]5G and COVID-19 to gain access to a huge audience. But there is a balance to strike, the campaigners said.
They continued:
We need to ensure that freedom of expression is not disproportionately restricted during this time. The sharing of information, analysis and ideas is vital for public engagement and trust. The Government must be transparent about any initiatives in this respect and ensure that any restrictions on freedom of expression are narrowly drawn and strictly necessary and proportionate to [the] legitimate aim of protecting public health.
The problem is, it seems, that opportunities to scrutinise government use of contact-tracing app data and the behaviour of the anti-fake-news team are being limited.
In April, the Information Commissioner's Office (ICO) said it would be "flexible around enforcing Freedom of Information obligations and has told requesters that they might experience delays when making information requests during the pandemic," according to the letter.
The impact on transparency is already clear, it goes on to claim. The groups mentioned an [6]FoI request made on April 3 for more information about patient data-sharing deals between the UK Government and tech companies that had not yet received a substantive reply .
Concerns in the campaigners' letter are supported by news that [7]a unit of the MoD, called jHub, would be "facilitating the secure transfer of relevant symptom and epidemiology data from the third party COVID-19 apps to the NHSx datastore ."
Meanwhile, evidence mounts that the contact tracing app is [8]riddled with bugs and fails to anonymise data .
The Register has contacted Number 10 and the ICO for their response. ®
[1] https://www.article19.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/05/Open-letter-UK-final.pdf
[2] https://www.theregister.co.uk/2020/05/14/nhs_contact_tracing_app/
[3] https://www.theregister.co.uk/2020/05/05/uk_coronavirus_app/
[4] https://www.gov.uk/government/news/government-cracks-down-on-spread-of-false-coronavirus-information-online
[5] https://www.theregister.co.uk/2020/05/04/britains_anti5g_protests/
[6] https://www.theregister.co.uk/2020/05/19/covid19_nhs_data_store_open_letter/
[7] https://www.theregister.co.uk/2020/05/20/mod_covid_19_app_data_anonymising/
[8] https://www.theregister.co.uk/2020/05/14/nhs_contact_tracing_app/
Re: Thank you
Contact tracing is needed until a vaccine is available so installing the app is a reasonable thing to do for the greater good of everyone. But the government needs to guarantee everyone's privacy and mandate that all data collected and related to this app is completely and permanently erased once we finally have the upper hand on the current situation.
But that's not going to happen is it?
Re: Thank you
Still yet to see a solid answer to a simple question
If someone I may of briefly passed in the street gets Covid19, then what?
Do I self isolate because of that 2 second interaction, where the chance of catching are close to zero. Or do I just ignore it?
If the former, expect cities to grind to a complete halt in a few days.
If the latter, what is the point of the app?
Re: Thank you
The intention (not sure how well it has been implemented) was for only "significant risk" contacts to be recorded, which are those lasting 10 minutes or longer (*). It cant tell whether said contact is outside or indoors, which I would have thought was quite relevant.
(*) This is unlikely to be welcomed by those who throw a tantrum if someone walks past them without leaping into the road to ensure their 2 meter bubble.
Re: Thank you
The apps (this and those based on the Apple/Google API) record the length of contact and the response is based on that so the contact length could be set for, say 2 minutes. That's been said a number of times.
What's not been said is how it deals with multiple short contacts. There's no particular duration at which you suddenly become infected if you're in contact a second longer; it's a matter of increasing probability. On that basis multiple short contacts should eventually raise the probability over whatever threshold is set for the long contact. But does the tracing add up all your 2 second contacts so that 60 of those are equivalent to a 2 minute contact?
Re: Thank you
Not convinced that contract tracing is needed for a virus that's now showing to finish off just 1 in 1450 infected persons on average. Far more appropriate would be self-isolation / risk-reduction by / for those in high risk groups.
Numpties!
The lot of them at NHSX
With this and the even the MOD getting in on the act... the mind boggles.
Nothing unexpected here then.
All these concerns were raised before the excuse for a prototype was more than a gleam in Boris' eye. Just reinforces my decision to have nothing to do with the app in anything like its current or currently intended form.
Legal framework
Parliament has to quickly issue an adequate legal framework.
With GCHQ, the only legal framework I'd trust is not having installed the app in the first place.
If you ain't got nothing to hide
When it comes to GCHQ there is not a lot they don't know about you anyway - it's a pointless point you are trying to make El-Reg.
I am personally in the Greater Good camp on this one.
Nothing to hide here
There's not a lot GCHQ don't know about you anyway, so pointless worrying about that problem.
People with an aversion to being snooped on have a very high and inflated opinion of themselves.
Like we really care what they are up to :)
I am personally in the 'Greater Good' camp on this one ... like most people.
Re: Nothing to hide here
Let's put your assumption to a vote, those in favour of using the app gimme a down vote, those avoiding it give an up vote. I expect most el Reg readers to vote up, if nothing else as having Bluetooth always on is a battery killer anyway...
The app is pretty useless now considering it should have been tested and ready to be installed BEFORE Boris decided to tell people to go back to work a week ago. So now we will be over 2 weeks of people moving about possibly infecting others with no way to contract trace and no app until June.
Just look at the 1000s of people cramming on to UK beaches, beauty spots, parks etc because we are having the hot weather who could be spreading the virus right now.
Other countries have had an app ready for their citizen to install weeks ago but as usual the UK had to do something different and go for a data slurping centralised model which is not fit for purpose.
Apple/Google APIs
The main challenge with contact tracing is keeping the relevant sensors always on to detect the presence of others. Most iOS and Android end users won't care about the impact to battery life and filesystem storage but I do. My vote is to have every single device forcibly install an optional contact tracing database function as a critical system update which is enabled by default BUT with a simple off switch for those wishing to save their device resources rather than the 'greater good' of society. If 99.9% of users choose to accept the tracking then fine but at least provide an off switch, similar to those weird folks who don't even use a smartphone :)
"The existing legal framework for the app, currently being trialled on the Isle of Wight, is inadequate to protect people from misuse of their data, as noted by the Joint Committee on Human Rights."
Australia has a two page Act to cover this;
https://www.legislation.gov.au/Details/F2020L00480
Take that and add a "cannot be accessed via RIPA" clause and it's done and dusted.
Importantly it also addresses third party coercion or abuse;
9 Coercing the use of COVIDSafe
(1) A person must not require that another person:
(a) download COVIDSafe to a mobile telecommunications device; or
(b) have COVIDSafe in operation on a mobile telecommunications device; or
(c) consent to uploading COVID app data from a mobile telecommunications device to the National COVIDSafe Data Store.
(2) A person must not:
(a) refuse to enter into, or continue, a contract or arrangement with another person (including a contract of employment); or
(b) take adverse action (within the meaning of the Fair Work Act 2009) against another person; or
(c) refuse to allow another person to enter premises; or
(d) refuse to allow another person to participate in an activity; or
(e) refuse to receive goods or services from another person; or
(f) refuse to provide goods or services to another person;
on the ground that, or on grounds that include the ground that, the other person:
(g) has not downloaded COVIDSafe to a mobile telecommunications device; or
(h) does not have COVIDSafe in operation on a mobile telecommunications device; or
(i) has not consented to uploading COVID app data from a mobile telecommunications device to the National COVIDSafe Data Store.
Thank you
I'd like to thank the people that help make this country safer by installing and using this app.
Your sacrifice benefits us all, including people like me that aren't letting it anywhere near our own devices.