Apollo 13 set off into space 50 years ago today. An ignored change order ensured it did not make it to the Moon...
- Reference: 1586632391
- News link: https://www.theregister.co.uk/2020/04/11/apollo_13/
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The post-launch explosion that to led what was arguably NASA's finest hour began, according to former director of Flight Operations Christopher Kraft in his book Flight , not with a mishandling of a liquid oxygen tank (although that could well have been a contributing factor) but with a simple decision not to follow up on a change order.
Kraft recalled that Apollo pad technicians sometimes couldn't completely flush the tanks after testing, and so turned on the spacecraft's low power internal heater to boil off the oxygen, a process that could take eight hours.
For the agency's Block 2 spacecraft, those designed to get to the Moon rather than orbit Earth, the pad power supply was upped from 28 to 65 volts, which required a special harness. Manufacturers of the Apollo spacecraft, North American Aviation, and the Apollo Spacecraft Program Office ordered the Beech Aircraft Company, which made the tank, to fit a 65-volt thermostat switch in all the Block 2 tanks, [1]wrote Kraft.
"Beech didn't do it," Kraft added, "and the program office didn't follow up. Apollo 13, and the earlier missions, too, flew with a 28 volt switch. A unique set of circumstances brought on disaster."
When emptying a rocket tank, the liquid oxygen was usually forced out using pressurized nitrogen. After a Countdown Demonstration Test, engineers were unable to subsequently empty Oxygen Tank 2. "The tube in the tank wouldn't function properly," wrote Kraft, "it was misaligned, and liquid oxygen leaked back into the tank instead of draining."
NASA's classic worm logo returns for first all-American trip to ISS in years: Are you a meatball or a squiggly fan? [2]READ MORE
That tube may have been misaligned in 1968 when the tank suffered a drop of approximately two inches at a North American Aviation factory: while the chance of damage was low, the fill line assembly may have suffered. The tank was tested – which didn't require filling it with liquid oxygen – and, once given the all-clear, installed that year into the service module for Apollo 13.
Fast forward to March 1970, and Apollo 13 is on the launchpad. Faced with a tank that needed draining completely before filling with liquid oxygen, the engineers at the Cape used the heaters to boil off the tank's contents. It was the first time the process had been used and "nobody," said Kraft, "recognized the damage that could occur."
There was a thermostat for the heater, remember? It was designed to shut off when the temperature hit 80 degrees Fahrenheit. However, it was also designed for 28-volts not the 65-volts applied to it. "Its contacts literally melted," said Kraft, "and closed the switch."
Continuous power then ran through the Teflon-insulated wires for the next eight hours. The temperature of those wires rose past 800 degrees Fahrenheit, with some estimates putting it nearer 1,000 degrees, melting the Teflon and leaving the wires bare.
The instruments available to the ground technicians, according to Kraft, only went to 100 degrees: "They didn't see anything happen." There was no outward sign of the failure of the switch, nor a chance to inspect the wiring.
The tank had, after all, passed its ground inspection.
The launch of Apollo 13
Having demonstrated with Apollo 12 that a near pin-point landing was possible, Apollo 13 was to intended to kick-off lunar exploration properly despite waning public interest and the cancellation of Apollo 20. Apollo 18 and 19 were also looking doubtful, and would eventually be cancelled by 1971.
Commanded by Gemini and Apollo veteran Jim Lovell, with Jack Swigert as Command Module Pilot and Fred Haise as Lunar Module Pilot, Apollo 13 had already suffered a few issues. Alan Shepard was supposed to lead the mission, though Lovell's crew, slated for Apollo 14, were swapped in when it was decided Shepard could use a little more training time. Swigert was also a late addition to the crew, added days before launch after Ken Mattingly, intended to be the lunar pilot, was exposed to German measles, having never previously contracted it, and removed from the trip.
The launch of Apollo 13, which was supposed to send the Command Module Odyssey and Lunar Module Aquarius to the Moon, occurred at 1913 UTC on April 11. The first-stage flight was uneventful, or at least as uneventful as a Saturn V gets.
The second stage did not go quite so well, as the [3]Flight Evaluation Report [PDF] on vehicle AS-508 explained: "High amplitude oscillations in the 14 to 16 hertz range during the S-II mainstage were sufficiently severe to cause the center engine to shut down 132 seconds early." While this effect was an "inherent characteristic," the high amplitude was unexpected. No matter, though, mission controllers swiftly calculated how long the remaining four engines would need to run for and passed the information to the crew.
After the second stage burn was complete, the S-IVB ignited and placed the spacecraft into orbit. Following the usual orbital check-out of the spacecraft's systems and trajectory parameters, the go for translunar injection burn was given.
"We heaved sighs of relief," [4]recalled Flight Director Gene Kranz in his book Failure Is Not An Option , "thinking we had gotten through what would probably be the one major glitch in the mission."
NASA's [5]history office remarked: "At 46 hours 43 minutes Joe Kerwin, the CapCom on duty, said, 'The spacecraft is in real good shape as far as we are concerned. We're bored to tears down here.' It was the last time anyone would mention boredom for a long time."
The story continues in part two – though, here are some additional tomes and materials to peruse if you're so inclined (spoiler alert)... ®
Further reading
As well as Flight: My Life in Mission Control by the late Chris Kraft and Failure Is Not an Option by Gene Kranz, Normal Accidents by Charles Perrow was also [6]useful in researching this article, as was Apollo 13 [7]by James Lovell and Jeffrey Kluger. Thirteen: The Apollo Flight That Failed by Henry S. F. Cooper is also well worth a [8]read .
NASA's own history archives proved a delightful click-hole into which to tumble.
Finally, season two of Kevin Fong's superb 13 Minutes To The Moon [9]podcast is highly recommended – as is season one, which retells the Apollo 11 landing. And also some movie starring Tom Hanks. ®
Sponsored: [10]Choosing A Low-Code Vendor
[1] https://www.goodreads.com/book/show/141498.Flight
[2] https://www.theregister.co.uk/2020/04/03/nasa_worm_logo_spacex_iss/
[3] https://ia600304.us.archive.org/30/items/nasa_techdoc_19900066486/19900066486.pdf
[4] https://www.goodreads.com/book/show/141499.Failure_is_Not_an_Option
[5] https://science.ksc.nasa.gov/history/apollo/apollo-13/apollo-13.html
[6] https://press.princeton.edu/books/paperback/9780691004129/normal-accidents
[7] https://www.barnesandnoble.com/w/apollo-13-james-lovell/1103016470
[8] https://www.goodreads.com/book/show/1391538.XIII
[9] https://www.bbc.co.uk/programmes/w13xttx2/episodes/downloads
[10] https://go.theregister.co.uk/tl/1936/-8579/choosing-a-low-code-vendor?td=wptl1936
Lucky 13
I watched the drama unfold on the TV, a 12 yo, with zero understanding of how they had actually managed to do any of the rocket stuff, but absolutely mesmerised by it all since Apollo 8 and Christmas 1968 when they had orbited the moon, have watched the movie, and I still got goosebumps when things went wrong.
Now, reading this and discovering just how LITTLE a failure can cascade into one almighty clusterfuck, it is sort of mindblowing just how hard they worked to get the crew back alive, makes you wonder what else occurred that caused loss of life through tiny errors that were compounded by ongoing acceptance of the faults ?
what was that quote ? if the Saturn V was 'only' 99% good, it would still mean there were 000's of dud parts in the beast
to ME, the space exploration game IS important, but I can also see that people may call it out as there are still people within the USA without the most basic requirements for the most basic of a reasonable survival, but I would hope that if we DO finally gain access to the STARS, that it WILL make a difference here on earth / home
FFS, FIFTY years, feels like it was only a few years ago, wondering what it would be like in the 21st Century, now we are 20 years in, and I, for one, wouldn't mind going back there right now :o)
Re: Lucky 13
As an engineer I can tell you it's never the big stuff that's had a lot of spadework put into it - it's always the tiny little things missed that'll bite you on the ass. Challenger for example - a single insualation tile knocked off.
Re: Lucky 13
Close, Challenger was down to a failed O ring on the fuel system for the boosters, Columbia was down to falling debris on launch that damaged the insulation on the wing.
Re: Lucky 13
Yeah sorry - should have said Columbia. Point still stands though: both were caused by tiny little failures in the systems. Hope Elon Musk has more luck!
Re: Lucky 13
Elon doesn't really rely on luck. He designs with adequate margin then tests the living hell out of things.
Re: Lucky 13
That's what NASA was doing - or at least thought they were doing - and it still went pearshaped. Many people don't have enough respect for a) Murphy's Law and b) Plan B.
Re: Lucky 13
Columbia was done in because they had to change the formula of the foam used to insulate the main tank, in order to make it more "environmentally friendly". The change made it more liable to holding moisture and less able to retain structural integrity.
Re: Lucky 13
Errr, no. The O-ring that caused the Challenger crash was nothing to do with any fuel system. Instead it was an essential structural part of one of the two Solid Rocket Boosters. Its job was to seal the joint between two of the stacked steel cylinders that formed the SRB's structure.
The whole assembly was cold-soaked overnight and then launched with the air temperature still below the minimum permitted launch temperature. As a result the O-ring was rigid, rather than resilient, and so was unable to do its job of keeping high pressures inside the rocket casing. This let extremely hot gasses escape, eventually in a strong enough jet to cut through the struts holding the SRB in position.
At that point the SRB pivoted on its remaining attachment, punching a big hole in the external fuel tank and sealing the fate of the crew: there was no emergency crew exit on Challenger.
The launch decision was a classic management error, not helped at all by the perceived pressure of "its live on TV - we can't mess up their schedule or disappoint the viewing public" and compounded by "we've launched below minimum temp before, so nothing can possibly go wrong this time".
There';s a very good, and readable, account of the subsequent investigation and accident analysis in Richard Feynman's book "What do YOU care what other people think?".
Yeah - engineers can and do make mistakes. But if a serious $hitshow happens it's usually the management! ;-)
Re: Lucky 13
You're obviously a steel eyed rocket man! ;-) :-)
A masterful analysis - bravo. Looking forward to part two!
Cancellations
Strictly speaking it was Apollos 15 and 19 were the second batch of cancellations, with 16-18 being renumbered to become 15-17. In the original schedule Apollo 16 was going to be the first to carry an LRV so the less capable all-walking version of 15 was the one that got the chop.
Re: Cancellations
And Saturn V production had been canceled in August 1968, over half a year before even landing on the Moon, and before even Apollo 7. This meant Apollo 20 was canceled so its Saturn V could launch Skylab (AKA the Apollo Applications Project workshop)
https://www.nasa.gov/feature/50-years-ago-nasa-cancels-apollo-20-mission
13 Minutes To The Moon
This podcast is absolutely epic. Particularly season 1
Kevin Fongs voice is especially mellifluous, so perfect to get off to sleep to (and then catch up with missed bits the next day)
Perrow
Normal Accidents by Charles Perrow was also useful in researching this article,
+1 for "Normal Accidents", one of the best books on IT failures I've ever read, especially as it's about complex systems in general rather than digital computers in particular (though they make a few appearances in passing.) I once worked at a shop with an office bookshelf staff were encouraged to contribute to: I bought two (used) copies of Normal Accidents for it -- used, because - inexplicably - it's out of print. Can't recommend strongly enough.