News: 0185569624

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Apple's New iPhone Camera Mode Promises to Prove Your Photo Isn't AI

(Wednesday September 09, 2026 @11:30PM (BeauHD) from the authenticated-photos dept.)


Apple is [1]introducing a new "Reference Image" mode on the iPhone 18 Pro and Pro Max that uses the camera sensor to [2]digitally sign captured data and create an "unalterable" version of a photo , giving users a way to verify what the camera actually saw before any edits were made. The Verge reports:

> As AI-generated images and videos become more realistic, several new standards have emerged to label images not created by a human, such as SynthID, C2PA, and Meta's Content Seal. Apple is putting a twist on these methods by building authentication directly into its hardware.

>

> Apple is letting developers access a Reference Image API across iOS, iPadOS, and macOS, which could eventually allow users to inspect these digitally-signed photos in third-party apps. The company says the iPhone 18 Pro lineup won't come with its Reference Image feature at launch in the European Union, but says users in the region will still be able to "develop and view" them in iOS 27, iPadOS 27, and macOS 27.



[1] https://www.apple.com/newsroom/2026/09/apple-debuts-iphone-18-pro-and-iphone-18-pro-max/

[2] https://www.theverge.com/tech/992766/apple-iphone-18-pro-reference-image



Prior art (Score:2, Interesting)

by Hadlock ( 143607 )

Nice, i posted prior art about this back in 2017 so lmk if apple tries to sue you over any patent on this

Re: (Score:3)

by snikulin ( 889460 )

Canon did it well before 2017

Re: (Score:2)

by PPH ( 736903 )

I've got decades of head start on that. My thumbprint on every lens.

ecurity by obscurity (Score:3, Interesting)

by v1 ( 525388 )

From the sounds of it, the private key used to sign the photograph is IN the camera. So every user holds a private key in their hands they just can't easily get at to use to sign their slop.

And this means it just takes one smart fellow to tear the camera apart and extract the key, and they can sign al the pictures they want to, at least "from that camera".

I suppose as is the case with any asymmetric key-signing system, they'll have a "revocation list" they can use to burn any pictures signed by a "stolen" key once they discover it's been lifted and is out in the wild.

So at that point all the signature can say is "it's not AI until proven otherwise "

And lastly, what's to stop me from generating some slop and throwing it up on a nice monitor and taking a picture of it? Jackalopes are real, I can prove it, here's a certified picture I took of one!

Re: (Score:2)

by ffkom ( 3519199 )

> I suppose as is the case with any asymmetric key-signing system, they'll have a "revocation list" they can use to burn any pictures signed by a "stolen" key once they discover it's been lifted and is out in the wild.

You mean "stolen key" as in "key of a camera someone happened to make pictures with that show members of the 0.1% doing crimes"?

Re: (Score:1)

by caseih ( 160668 )

I've never heard of anyone extracting a key from a TPM chip, and no doubt Apple will be using a similar mechanism. This is pretty secure that way. The problem I have with it is it places verification in the hands of one company, Apple. And it requires a whole certificate infrastructure, similar to what SSL has. We'll have to have public lists of signed keys for verification, revocation lists, etc. If every camera maker adopts a similar system, will we have one big compatible system (sort of like SSL), o

Re: (Score:2)

by gweihir ( 88907 )

Yes. Some hardware hacker that is bored on the weekend will do it.

Re: (Score:2)

by gweihir ( 88907 )

Crypto-keys have no copyright or other protection. They have no "invention" and no "creativity" in them. They are not "secrets" because they contain no information. Hence such a key will not even be "stolen".

Incidentally, a revocation list (which is an approach known to not work) will only make things worse, because with it nobody can depend on anything remaining signed.

The whole thing is trying to solve cryptographic attestation without a trusted 3rd party. There is no known well-working approach to that.

Re: ecurity by obscurity (Score:2)

by fubarrr ( 884157 )

FYI: You can get a TEM lab in China to lift the private key from a credit card chip for mere few thousand dollars

Re: ecurity by obscurity (Score:2)

by fubarrr ( 884157 )

And they can do it very fast. This gives a clue to who is their main target client for drilling the credit card chips

Excellent! Just like... It used to be (Score:2)

by gwolf ( 26339 )

Before all cameras were phones, and before all phones had beautifying AI filters, you could always refer to a believable original image... Right, I understand this adds some sort of device-linked cryptographic signature, but... this Big Feature deserves a Big Meh from me.

Re: (Score:2)

by ceoyoyo ( 59147 )

> you could always refer to a believable original image

You probably couldn't. Unless you were shooting in RAW the image you got was always extensively processed, with the original thrown away.

Having the camera sign devices has been a useful feature for a long time. And an expensive one. Example: [1]https://www.dpreview.com/artic... [dpreview.com]

[1] https://www.dpreview.com/articles/3146736527/canondvke2/

I thought this was/is RAW? (Score:2)

by kencurry ( 471519 )

n/t

Re: (Score:2)

by allo ( 1728082 )

nothing stops you from editing RAW files.

Nah, I'm good (Score:2)

by Powercntrl ( 458442 )

For a cost of entry starting at $1.2k, I really DGAF if anyone doubts the authenticity of my phone's photos. For better or worse, Apple gave the Duo all of the limelight this cycle. Everything else iPhone related that they announced felt like they just phoned it in this year.

Thus spake the master programmer:
"Though a program be but three lines long, someday it will have to
be maintained."
-- Geoffrey James, "The Tao of Programming"