A Fundamental Flaw Leaves LLMs Strikingly Vulnerable To Attack (technologyreview.com)
(Thursday July 30, 2026 @06:00PM (BeauHD)
from the AI-trickery dept.)
- Reference: 0184774820
- News link: https://slashdot.org/story/26/07/30/2037233/a-fundamental-flaw-leaves-llms-strikingly-vulnerable-to-attack
- Source link: https://www.technologyreview.com/2026/07/30/1140927/a-fundamental-flaw-leaves-llms-vulnerable-to-attack/
[1]joshuark quotes a report from MIT Technology Review:
> It is impossible to make large language models fully secure against hacks because of a fundamental flaw in how they work, a team of researchers argue in [2]a paper presented at the International Conference on Machine Learning, a top AI conference, this month. The claim has huge implications for the safety of this technology. By taking advantage of this flaw, which concerns how LLMs identify who or what is giving them instructions, the researchers were [3]able to make popular LLMs spit out information they had been trained not to provide , such as how to synthesize cocaine and how to sabotage a commercial aircraft's navigation system. "There's a real probability that this is going to be a problem that's fundamentally unsolvable," says Charles Ye, an independent researcher and coauthor of the ICML paper. [...]
>
> The ICML paper describes attacks against several of OpenAI's models, but Cui and Ye say that they have since seen similar results with models made by Anthropic, Alibaba, and DeepSeek. Cui and her colleagues wanted to find out why an attack like chain-of-thought forgery was so effective. They suspected it had something to do with the mechanism that LLMs use to keep track of where their instructions are coming from. But what Cui and her colleagues discovered is that LLMs are in fact very bad at keeping track of different roles.
>
> In a series of experiments that looked at what was going on inside a handful of different models, the researchers found that LLMs seem to identify the role of a specific chunk of text not by the tags around it but by the style of that text and the words it contains. The upshot, the researchers claim, is that all an attacker needs to do to hack an LLM is write text that spoofs a certain role. And because roles are a fundamental part of how LLMs work, no amount of training will fully solve the problem.
"There's going to be a huge economic incentive for people to do jailbreaks and prompt injections," says Cui. The best defense could be to expect the worst. Organizations shouldn't trust LLMs, and they should expect that anything done by agents could be unsafe, he says: "That's not a great solution, but it just might be what we have to do."
"It's really incredible that these things are being deployed everywhere to control super-critical systems. There's been no study of the fundamental science here. We're all doing it ad hoc."
[1] https://slashdot.org/~joshuark
[2] https://role-confusion.github.io/
[3] https://www.technologyreview.com/2026/07/30/1140927/a-fundamental-flaw-leaves-llms-vulnerable-to-attack/
> It is impossible to make large language models fully secure against hacks because of a fundamental flaw in how they work, a team of researchers argue in [2]a paper presented at the International Conference on Machine Learning, a top AI conference, this month. The claim has huge implications for the safety of this technology. By taking advantage of this flaw, which concerns how LLMs identify who or what is giving them instructions, the researchers were [3]able to make popular LLMs spit out information they had been trained not to provide , such as how to synthesize cocaine and how to sabotage a commercial aircraft's navigation system. "There's a real probability that this is going to be a problem that's fundamentally unsolvable," says Charles Ye, an independent researcher and coauthor of the ICML paper. [...]
>
> The ICML paper describes attacks against several of OpenAI's models, but Cui and Ye say that they have since seen similar results with models made by Anthropic, Alibaba, and DeepSeek. Cui and her colleagues wanted to find out why an attack like chain-of-thought forgery was so effective. They suspected it had something to do with the mechanism that LLMs use to keep track of where their instructions are coming from. But what Cui and her colleagues discovered is that LLMs are in fact very bad at keeping track of different roles.
>
> In a series of experiments that looked at what was going on inside a handful of different models, the researchers found that LLMs seem to identify the role of a specific chunk of text not by the tags around it but by the style of that text and the words it contains. The upshot, the researchers claim, is that all an attacker needs to do to hack an LLM is write text that spoofs a certain role. And because roles are a fundamental part of how LLMs work, no amount of training will fully solve the problem.
"There's going to be a huge economic incentive for people to do jailbreaks and prompt injections," says Cui. The best defense could be to expect the worst. Organizations shouldn't trust LLMs, and they should expect that anything done by agents could be unsafe, he says: "That's not a great solution, but it just might be what we have to do."
"It's really incredible that these things are being deployed everywhere to control super-critical systems. There's been no study of the fundamental science here. We're all doing it ad hoc."
[1] https://slashdot.org/~joshuark
[2] https://role-confusion.github.io/
[3] https://www.technologyreview.com/2026/07/30/1140927/a-fundamental-flaw-leaves-llms-vulnerable-to-attack/