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Challenger at 40: The disaster that changed NASA

(2026/01/28)


Forty years ago, Space Shuttle Challenger disintegrated 73 seconds into its flight, killing its crew of seven and exposing the management culture and decision-making process that led NASA to launch on a freezing January day.

Four decades on, the technical facts that led to the destruction of Challenger are clear. Erosion had been noted in the rubber O-rings that sealed the segments of the twin solid rocket boosters (SRBs) mounted to either side of the Shuttle stack's external fuel tank. The temperature at launch was 36°F (15° colder than any previous launch).

Just after liftoff, the primary and secondary O-rings at the base of the right-hand SRB failed. The Rogers Commission report, an official investigation into the Space Shuttle Challenger disaster, [1]noted : "At 0.678 seconds into the flight, photographic data show a strong puff of gray smoke was spurting from the vicinity of the aft field joint on the right Solid Rocket Booster."

[2]

More puffs were visible as the Shuttle accelerated. "The vaporized material streaming from the joint indicated there was not complete sealing action within the joint."

[3]

[4]

During the flight, the Shuttle experienced several high-altitude wind shear events, all within design limits, but which caused the SRB steering system to be "more active than on any previous flight."

At 58.788 second, a flickering flame was noted on the right SRB, at or near the aft field joint. That plume increased, and from approximately 62 seconds, the control system began to correct for the forces caused by the plume. This carried on for another nine seconds. At 64.66 seconds, the first visual indication that the flame had breached the External Tank was noted.

[5]

At approximately 72 seconds, a series of events happened in rapid succession. The lower strut linking the right SRB to the tank was severed, permitting it to rotate around the upper strut. A structural failure of the hydrogen tank occurred, releasing large amounts of liquid hydrogen and enveloping the Space Shuttle in a massive explosion.

The Shuttle was traveling at Mach 1.92 at an altitude of 46,000 feet. Its reaction control system ruptured, and the reddish-brown colors of the burning hypergolic fuel were visible on the edge of the main fireball. The Orbiter broke apart under severe aerodynamic loads, with several sections visible, including the forward fuselage and a mass of umbilical lines ripped from the payload bay.

The crew consisted of Dick Scobee, Michael J. Smith, Ronald McNair, Ellison Onizuka, Judith Resnik, Gregory Jarvis, and Christa McAuliffe. It was third time lucky for Jarvis after having to make way for US Senator Jake Garn in April 1985 and US Representative Bill Nelson in January 1986. Nelson's flight, STS-61-C, was the mission chronologically before.

[6]

In his book Riding Rockets, former astronaut Mike Mullane speculated on the fate of the crew. The cockpit had survived more or less intact, but all electrical power was lost at the moment of breakup. "The mayhem of breakup lasted only a moment before the equally startling calm of free fall began."

The Personal Egress Air Packs (PEAPs) for the pilot, Mike Smith, were activated, probably by Judy Resnik or Ellison Onizuka. "Scobee and Smith were test pilots and reacted as they had been trained," wrote Mullane. "They had faced countless serious emergencies in their flying careers. They knew the situation was perilous, but they were in a cockpit with a control stick, and there was a runway only twenty miles away. They believed they had a chance."

The cockpit, however, was electrically dead. No amount of button mashing or switch flicking could restore control to the blossoming cloud of debris that Challenger had become. The crew members on the upper deck had window views of the disaster as the cockpit tumbled over its arc. The three on the mid-deck – Ronald McNair, Christa McAuliffe, and Gregory Jarvis – were in a darkened, tumbling room, with no communication to inform them of events.

[7]Congress ctrl-Zs bulk of proposed cuts to NASA science

[8]How do you solve a problem like Discovery?

[9]After nearly half a century in deep space, every ping from Voyager 1 is a bonus

[10]Mysterious X-37B spaceplane flies again, this time carrying a quantum GPS alternative

Investigators were not able to conclusively state that the crew was unconscious by the time the cockpit hit the ocean surface. At 207 mph and with a deceleration force of more than 200 g, it wasn't survivable. Unlike Mullane, former Apollo astronaut and chief of the Astronaut Office John Young reckoned that even with the activation of the PEAPs, the crew had only a few seconds of useful consciousness. Enough time to flick some switches, but not much more. He noted in his book Forever Young that the "PEAPs supplied only unpressurized air that was not all that helpful at the altitude of the breakup."

The managerial and cultural factors behind the disaster are equally well documented. The Rogers Commission stated: "The decision to launch the Challenger was flawed. Those who made that decision were unaware of the recent history of problems concerning the O-rings and the joint and were unaware of the initial written recommendation of the contractor advising against the launch at temperatures below 53 degrees Fahrenheit and the continuing opposition of the engineers at Thiokol after the management reversed its position.

"They did not have a clear understanding of Rockwell's concern that it was not safe to launch because of ice on the pad. If the decision-makers had known all of the facts, it is highly unlikely that they would have decided to launch 51-L on January 28, 1986."

As John Young put it later, after summarizing the concerns of the Thiokol engineers, worries about the erosion noted on the O-rings, and the decision-making process that led to the launch: "We astronauts would have thought differently."

The Challenger disaster reverberated through NASA in the years after, though not always loudly enough to prevent the loss of Space Shuttle Columbia. In the chapter "Echoes of Challenger" in their book Comm Check…, Michael Cabbage and William Harwood presented parallels between the last flights of Challenger and Columbia, as presented to the [11]Columbia Accident Investigation Board [PDF].

Has NASA learned from the tragedies? It appears so, judging by the recent Starliner debacle, where caution and safety appeared to win the day in the decision to return the Boeing astronauts in a SpaceX capsule rather than risk a trip in Boeing's CST-100. However, there is also an argument that the astronauts should never have launched in the first place, considering the faults that were stacking up on the ground.

Today's anniversary is an important reminder for engineers to speak out when something doesn't look right, and for managers to listen.

Further reading

There are many sources of information regarding the Challenger disaster. This article drew on Mike Mullane's Riding Rockets and John Young's Forever Young. The Rogers Commission report is also an invaluable source, as are Charles Perrow's Normal Accidents and David Harland and Ralph Lorenz's Space System Failures. ®

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[1] https://www.nasa.gov/history/rogersrep/v1ch3.htm

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[7] https://www.theregister.com/2026/01/06/nasa_science_budget_boost/

[8] https://www.theregister.com/2025/10/24/how_do_you_solve_discovery_route/

[9] https://www.theregister.com/2025/09/07/48_years_voyager_1/

[10] https://www.theregister.com/2025/08/25/x37b_quantum_navigation_payload/

[11] https://sma.nasa.gov/SignificantIncidents/assets/columbia-accident-investigation-board-report-volume-1.pdf

[12] https://whitepapers.theregister.com/



Always bad decision...

Jou (Mxyzptlk)

Challenger was one of many catasrophic failures and near misses where technicians were overruled or somebody thought he might know better than the computer. And NASA is not alone.

Re: Always bad decision...

Flocke Kroes

The phrase I still hear is that engineers lack the background to make business decisions. If management really believe that it is time to demonstrate your business decision making ability by taking yours elsewhere.

See also ...

Eclectic Man

... the section 'Mr Feynman goes to Washington' from Richard Feynman's memoir "What do you care what other people think?" and appendix F.

It's all down to politics

DoctorPaul

Am I right in thinking that the O rings were only necessary because some politician made sure the boosters were manufactured in his State, so had to be made in sections for road transport? They could have been built on-site in a single piece but no, they had to bodge it with O rings!

Re: It's all down to politics

John F Jennings

Not sure if that is accurate precisely.

The SRB (Solid Rocket Booster) was made (in parts) in Utah by Rockwell (I think Grumman owns it now)- though that was primarily because thats were the rockwell solid fuel missile factory is (think Minuteman and Trident). They were designed to be moved in parts by rail (other parts moved by barge) - but florida did and does not have the factories to produce this beast... Remember as well that launches were originally planned to be possible from Vandenberg (California) or Edwards(I think).

The SRBS were designed to be modular to fit on a train to the final assembly and launch site- whereever within the US that might be.

Re: It's all down to politics

Flocke Kroes

In the initial design the SRBs were short and too wide to be transported by road or rail. The intent was to manufacture them locally at a purpose built factory. Politics selected Utah and forced a re-design to long, thin and in segments.

Re: It's all down to politics

IvyKing

The SRB's were made by Thiokol, not Rockwell. Hercules was the other Utah based SRB manufacturer at that time, but both facilities are now part of Northrop Grumman.

Re: It's all down to politics

WolfFan

IIRC the original plan was to build as one-piece units at Grumman (Northrup-Grumman? It's been a while) in Long Island and barge them down to Flori-duh. However, the boys in Utah got the contract thanks to political maneuvering (a Utah senator wanted it more than the two New York senators) so they were built in Utah and were to be shipped by rail. No rail cars could hold the entire unit, and besides There Be Mountains In Utah and on the way to Flori-duh, so the units were split up. O-rings had been used in other solid rocket thingies before; this was not a big deal. Launching in sub-freezing temps when the O-rings were not designed for such conditions, now that was a big deal. (Note that there were planned, but never flown, shuttle launches from Vandenberg in California as well as from Flori-duh, and it's a whole lot easier to send rockets by train from Utah to Cali than it would be to barge them from New York, and that was also a factor in the decision.)

What should have been done was to have spent some money, time, and effort on making the o-rings more cold-resistant, but the thought was, hey, it's the Gunshine State, it never gets cold there. (As I write this temps in the low 40s to 30s and maybe below are forecast for here in Palm Beach County, way south of Brevard and KSC, for this weekend. I spent a lot of time in Northern Indiana and still have my old heavy coat. I await with amusement the antics of locals who get out anoraks, toques, and scarves when the temp falls below 60 F. There may even be snow. I can't wait to see how certain people drive. Fun times.)

Ship fast

elsergiovolador

Break things

As they say.

Engineers Tried to Stop The Launch

User McUser

NPR has an excellent piece on the Thiokol engineers that tried to get NASA to cancel the launch and the Thiokol management that thought they knew better.

[1]https://www.npr.org/2026/01/25/g-s1-106940/40-years-after-challenger

[1] https://www.npr.org/2026/01/25/g-s1-106940/40-years-after-challenger

Re: Engineers Tried to Stop The Launch

Oh Matron!

This article cited is much better than the "appears to have been written with AI" Register article....

Re: Engineers Tried to Stop The Launch

spuck

American Scandal also did a quite good 5-episode season on the Challenger disaster: [1]https://wondery.com/shows/american-scandal/season/58/

Their episodes are dramatised to keep them entertaining, but I believe the facts are all there.

[1] https://wondery.com/shows/american-scandal/season/58/

RIP

Roj Blake

I remember the newsflash on the TV like it was yesterday.

Compulsory podcast plug

I ain't Spartacus

There's a good episode on Challenger on the BBC World Service 13 Minutes to the Moon podcast. A good description of the meetings at Morton Thiokol from one of the engineers. It's from the 3rd series, on the Shuttle, which sadly isn't quite as good as the first two series (on Apollos 11 and 13). Sadly Kevin Fong had gone off to make 16 Sunsets, also a podcast about the Shuttle, and I think if the team had stayed together they could have made as fine a series on the Shuttle as the other two. But both Shuttle series are still worth your time, because of the good interviews both got.

You can sort of see NASA management's point of view. In that they had a contractor changing the agreed launch minimums on them at the last minute, but hadn't yet finished their research into previous o-ring erosion. But on the other hand, when your contractor comes to you and says they're worried, it's pretty obvious that they've got a reason to be worried. And to bully their management to bully their engineers into silence is a pretty bloody big risk. And a bloody stupid one too.

There was a lot of risk built into the Shuttle design though. It's very easy to get into bad habits, when you're forced to ignore some risks in order to be able to fly at all. On the other hand, it could do stuff that nothing we've got now can do - even though we've got really impressive reusable rockets.

JLV

Tufte’s book Visual Explanations

https://library.stlawu.edu/system/files/2021-02/tufte-visual-and-statistical.pdf

also uses Challenger as an example of where a well-articulated visual briefing, one not deployed by the engineering teams would have communicated the risks better to non-technical decision makers.

Contrast that, same book, with how cholera was “solved” in 19th century London, convincing politicians before germ theory was accepted: a convincing image is worth a thousand words.

Would that my hand were as swift as my tongue.
-- Alfieri