UK asks cyberspies to probe whether Chinese buses can be switched off remotely
- Reference: 1762862138
- News link: https://www.theregister.co.uk/2025/11/11/uk_probe_china_bus_claim/
- Source link:
This follows concerns raised by Norwegian public transport service operator, Ruter, which conducted cybersecurity tests on a new vehicle made by bus maker Yutong and said it identified vulnerabilities in its on-board systems.
Yutong is a Chinese manufacturer based in Zhengzhou, Henan province. The vehicles it produces are used by bus operators in several European countries, including the UK. Meanwhile, the importer of Yutong vehicles for the UK and Ireland region, Pelican, has disputed the claims and says the vehicles meet all security certifications.
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Public transport operator Ruter, which serves commuters in Norwegian capital Oslo as well as the [2]outlying Akershus county , claimed: "The Chinese supplier has direct digital access to each individual bus for software updates and diagnostics, including access to the battery and power supply management system. In theory, the bus could therefore be stopped or rendered inoperable by the manufacturer.
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"Currently, Ruter can disconnect the bus from the internet by removing the SIM card, as all connectivity to the network goes through this single point. This ensures that we retain local control if necessary," it added.
There are about 700 Yutong-made buses already in the UK, primarily in Nottingham, south Wales and Glasgow, operated by companies including Stagecoach and First Bus.
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A UK Department for Transport spokesperson told The Register : "We are aware of recent speculation concerning certain electric bus manufacturers. The Department takes security issues extremely seriously and works closely with the intelligence community to understand and mitigate potential risks."
The NCSC declined to comment.
In a statement, the IT Director of mega UK bus operator First Bus, Gavin Davies, said: "Cyber security risk is a core element of our procurement process for new electric buses. Ruter's work in Norway is helpful for wider industry learning, and it's really encouraging that they are carrying out tests and exploring how security systems can be improved even further."
[6]Transport for London confirms 5,000 users' bank data exposed, pulls large chunks of IT infra offline
[7]China warns Dutch away from Nexperia as it lets chip exports resume
[8]FCC plans to kill Wi-Fi on school buses, hotspots for library patrons
[9]So you CAN turn an entire car into a video game controller
Rival operator Stagecoach declined to comment, but instead directed us to Pelican Bus and Coach, which was appointed Yutong importer for the UK and Ireland in 2014.
Ian Downie, Pelican's head of Yutong sales, denied there was any security risk, and told The Register that all the vehicles it deals with are manually updated by engineers that physically go to the customer's site and apply any software patches.
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Yutong strictly complies with the applicable laws, regulations, and industry standards of the locations where its vehicles operate, Pelican added in a statement.
"Yutong vehicles exported to Europe comply with the UN R155 Cyber Security and Cyber Security Management System, UN R156 Software Update and Software Update Management System, ISO 27001 Information Security Management Systems, and ISO 27701 Privacy Information Management Systems. These regulations establish unified standards for vehicle cybersecurity and cybersecurity management systems," the company said.
According to Pelican, Yutong stores EU vehicle terminal data at an AWS datacenter in Frankfurt. The data is used for maintenance, optimization and service improvements, and cannot be accessed without signed customer authorization.
Pelican said Yutong vehicles in Europe do not support remote control of acceleration, steering, or braking. However, this doesn't address Ruter's specific claim: that Yutong can potentially remotely access the power supply management system and potentially disable buses. Pelican did not respond to questions about whether Yutong has any remote access to the vehicles. ®
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[2] https://ruter.no/en/about-our-tickets/zones-and-zone-maps
[3] https://pubads.g.doubleclick.net/gampad/jump?co=1&iu=/6978/reg_security/front&sz=300x50%7C300x100%7C300x250%7C300x251%7C300x252%7C300x600%7C300x601&tile=4&c=44aRNrpj1V_92EvQB8faCwpwAAAYM&t=ct%3Dns%26unitnum%3D4%26raptor%3Dfalcon%26pos%3Dmid%26test%3D0
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[6] https://www.theregister.com/2024/09/12/transport_for_londons_cyber_attack/
[7] https://www.theregister.com/2025/11/07/china_allows_nexperia_chip_exports/
[8] https://www.theregister.com/2025/09/05/fcc_to_kill_wifi_school_buses/
[9] https://www.theregister.com/2025/06/27/renault_clio_racing_controller/
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[11] https://whitepapers.theregister.com/
Re: Well... yeah, but nah?
So true... and the idea that they can just "remove the SIM card" and everything is fine is just ridiculous. That certainly won't fix a bricked bus that has downloaded and installed a malicious firmware update. Unless the bus has a "bad firmware incoming" indicator light, of course.
The fact that almost every other computer system the state relies on is based on Windows,Oracle, SAP, etc. and their related updates, telemetry and phoning-home and all of which can be turned off remotely from foreign countries doesn't seem to bother them at all.
Where there's smoke, there's a fire...
Imagine the chaos if a major portion of public transport buses got bricked (or stopped from working normally) in a couple of countries.... and private transport too...
Arguably, with the generally poor reliability of the public transport network people are used to things not working, so they would barely notice if something got bricked, it would just become another reason to add to the list of why you won't get home before your dinner is spoiled or why you can't get to that meeting on time.
The whole remote telemetry and always-on principles need to be balanced against when reporitng or maintenance can be done. Why not just download it when you get back to a depot and use a local server there, since the local team with spanners live in the same place too. There is absolutely no need for hooking them up to the cloud.
Same will happen when the computer and public cloud infrastructure they often rely on are blocked by their respective supplier. But I guess since it would be most likely USA based supplier it's all good...
Cyberspies
Did Cyberspies read my heavily downvoted comment, months back, that this is a possibility?
Who would have thought.
Hello!
Compliance
"Compliance with standard(s)" != "without vulnerability(ies)".
Re: Compliance
The standard says the update channel must be secure, but what are you realistically going to do if they upload BusBricker2026 firmware to your bus? Ask the DGSE sink some ships to get your money back? Ask the USAF to bomb them to get your money back?
Re: Compliance
It's actually rather simple, do not accept anything that must be 'always connected' and apply software updates on your schedule.
The automatic update everything is a curse, mostly because software updates are not limited to bugfixes but more often than not they add half-baked non-requested changes or "features"
Keep licking the American boot, Britons
Meanwhile... Cisco and its collection of security holes gets a free pass. Not even a mention.
Re: Keep licking the American boot, Britons
Cisco make buses? Who knew?
Can we have a whataboutism icon?
Re: Keep licking the American boot, Britons
You know exactly what I am referring to. But apparently Cisco gets a free pass from you. American security holes = good, apple pie, church going, let's grab some Winchesters, red white a blue holes. Chinese security holes = bad, reds under the bed, bad.
The extent of the blind eye being turned to Cisco is astonishing.
Re: Keep licking the American boot, Britons
I can neither deny or confirm the suggestion, but...
...last decade when I audited a number of switch/router software stacks (including Huawei) the only manufacturer that would not allow me access to all of the code was Cisco.
Anon to avoid association with the OP, who I do not normally agree with.
Pelican is wilfully missing the point...
It doesn't make any difference whether you manually or remotely update your bus/whatever, if you don't know exactly what the update is/does, and can verify it, you have no security - thus you need to trust the manufacturer because you are at their mercy.
So if there's reason to believe your supplier might maliciously 'update' your safety-critical device, you shouldn't have bought it in the first place, and you certainly shouldn't apply unchecked updates (though you may be too late of course)... not really rocket-science.
Hands up who trusts Chinese manufacturers, or more to the point, the Chinese government! Other countries are available.
Not that I trust our own or our allies' manufacturers or governments even in peace-time, but at least their software updates/cock-ups probably aren't malicious.
Trust no country or corporation and vet all updates should be at the core of security, unfortunately, users won't have that as too inconvenient and so a level of trust is given that is then always abused in the name of profit.
Which modern vehicle can not be remotely disabled ?
Not sure about right-ponders, but us wrong-ponders have been receiving OnStar love for decades, now available in your preferred brand's colors at your friendly car manufacturers' shop.
"Cyber security risk is a core element of our procurement process for new electric buses. Ruter's work in Norway is helpful for wider industry learning, and it's really encouraging that they are carrying out tests and exploring how security systems can be improved even further."
It's at the core of their procurement process how come they hadn't done such tests already?
Free software the answer
The only real solution is to insist that the bus software is free, buildable and modifiable by the customer.
Oh really?
"Currently, Ruter can disconnect the bus from the internet by removing the SIM card, as all connectivity to the network goes through this single point. This ensures that we retain local control if necessary,"
It's a bus. How many SIMs can the manufacturer conceal in it? Even allowing for the need for positioning for reliable communications...
Well... yeah, but nah?
OK, it is mainly the OTA firmware update that they found. And this can (in principle and in practice) be used to brick a machine (like stolen agricultural equipment). So: yes, it is very possible.
No, this is not surprising to anybody who has even the slightest clue about anything IT. It is the exactly bloody same thing as when Sonos bricked the speakers.
I don't mean we should not care about this - we clearly do - I'm just saying that this is so widespread and unregulated that this should have been addressed already.