New SSL/TLS cert to live no longer than 47 days by 2029
- Reference: 1744666291
- News link: https://www.theregister.co.uk/2025/04/14/ssl_tls_certificates/
- Source link:
Today the certificates, which underpin things like encrypted HTTPS connections between browsers and websites, are good for up to 398 days before needing to be renewed. Apple [1]put out a proposal [2]last year to cut the maximum time between renewals, and got support from Big Tech pals.
Their argument being that shorter renewal periods mean compromised or stolen certificates can be abused for at the most days or weeks rather than months before expiring. On the one hand, that may mean more purchases from certificate issuers for cert holders; on the other, Let's Encrypt [3]provides perfectly good certificates for free and also helps automate the renewal process.
[4]
The vote on the much shorter lifetimes [5]passed over the weekend with certificate issuers voting 25-0 for the proposal and five abstentions by Entrust, IdenTrust, Japan Registry Services, SECOM Trust Systems, and TWCA. The certificate consumers - Apple, Google, Microsoft, and Mozilla - voted unanimously in favor of the proposal.
[6]
[7]
The depreciation schedule is now as follows:
March 15, 2026: Newly issued certificates, including their Domain Control Validation, aka DCV, will have to be renewed every 200 days.
March 15, 2027: That lifespan will go down to 100 days.
March 15, 2029: New SSL/TLS certificates will be limited to 47 days, and 10 days for DCVs.
"The industry’s unified support for reducing certificate lifespans to 47 days reflects a shared commitment to enhancing digital security and trust for all," [8]said Tim Callan, chief compliance officer at Sectigo and vice-chair of the CA/B Forum.
"This pivotal and positive advancement for our industry underscores the importance of agility and proactive risk management in today’s threat landscape while preparing for the risks of the quantum era."
[9]Apple drops a bomb on long-life HTTPS certificates: Safari to snub new security certs valid for more than 13 months
[10]Sysadmins rage over Apple's 'nightmarish' SSL/TLS cert lifespan cuts plot
[11]DigiCert gives unlucky folks 24 hours to replace doomed certificates after code blunder
[12]Firefox's Mozilla follows Google in losing trust in Entrust's TLS certificates
In 2020 Apple [13]unilaterally decided its software, primarily Safari, would no longer accept new HTTPS certificates that expired more than 13 months from their creation date, so its fight for shorter cert lifetimes has been rumbling on for a while.
"From a security perspective: I really like and understand that change," [14]said one denizen of the Reddit Sysadmin forum, in response to the weekend vote.
"From a sysadmin and operations perspective: What a stupid change. In the perfect cloud native, fully automated fantasy land, this might work and not even generate that much overhead work. In the real world, this will generate lots of manual work. At least, until folks replace their legacy hardware and manufacturers patch their s**t."
[15]
The gradual tightening of renewal deadlines is supposed to help companies adapt. It's increasingly clear IT admins are going to have to shift to automated systems for handling SSL/TLS certs in the coming years. ®
Get our [16]Tech Resources
[1] https://github.com/cabforum/servercert/pull/553/commits/76ca560955babfc4ee5dd32f91bf02180cf5a97c
[2] https://www.theregister.com/2024/10/15/apples_security_cert_lifespan/
[3] https://letsencrypt.org/getting-started/
[4] https://pubads.g.doubleclick.net/gampad/jump?co=1&iu=/6978/reg_security/cso&sz=300x50%7C300x100%7C300x250%7C300x251%7C300x252%7C300x600%7C300x601&tile=2&c=2Z_2FaV889TeecXgYWLONuQAAA0w&t=ct%3Dns%26unitnum%3D2%26raptor%3Dcondor%26pos%3Dtop%26test%3D0
[5] https://groups.google.com/a/groups.cabforum.org/g/servercert-wg/c/9768xgUUfhQ?pli=1
[6] https://pubads.g.doubleclick.net/gampad/jump?co=1&iu=/6978/reg_security/cso&sz=300x50%7C300x100%7C300x250%7C300x251%7C300x252%7C300x600%7C300x601&tile=4&c=44Z_2FaV889TeecXgYWLONuQAAA0w&t=ct%3Dns%26unitnum%3D4%26raptor%3Dfalcon%26pos%3Dmid%26test%3D0
[7] https://pubads.g.doubleclick.net/gampad/jump?co=1&iu=/6978/reg_security/cso&sz=300x50%7C300x100%7C300x250%7C300x251%7C300x252%7C300x600%7C300x601&tile=3&c=33Z_2FaV889TeecXgYWLONuQAAA0w&t=ct%3Dns%26unitnum%3D3%26raptor%3Deagle%26pos%3Dmid%26test%3D0
[8] https://www.businesswire.com/news/home/20250414207334/en/CABrowser-Forum-Passes-Ballot-to-Reduce-SSLTLS-Certificates-to-47-Day-Maximum-Term
[9] https://www.theregister.com/2020/02/20/apple_shorter_cert_lifetime/
[10] https://www.theregister.com/2024/10/15/apples_security_cert_lifespan/
[11] https://www.theregister.com/2024/07/31/digicert_certificates_revoked/
[12] https://www.theregister.com/2024/08/01/mozilla_entrust/
[13] https://www.theregister.com/2020/02/20/apple_shorter_cert_lifetime/
[14] https://old.reddit.com/r/sysadmin/comments/1jz562u/tls_certificate_lifespans_reduced_to_47_days_by/
[15] https://pubads.g.doubleclick.net/gampad/jump?co=1&iu=/6978/reg_security/cso&sz=300x50%7C300x100%7C300x250%7C300x251%7C300x252%7C300x600%7C300x601&tile=4&c=44Z_2FaV889TeecXgYWLONuQAAA0w&t=ct%3Dns%26unitnum%3D4%26raptor%3Dfalcon%26pos%3Dmid%26test%3D0
[16] https://whitepapers.theregister.com/
thats just fucking wonderful.
I bet the next rule change they make is that no entity will be permitted to renew a certificate if its been hacked, and doesn't have a clean statement of health from Mandiant.
I'm going to reconfigure my internal sub-CA to start giving out certificates that expire in 2030 (which is when my sub-CA cert expires.) Between now and 2030, I'll generate a new root CA and give it a 50 year lifetime and my new sub-CA will get a 25 year lifetime and just one more round of certificates and i'll be retired before they expire again.
The browser/CA forum are solving the wrong problem. We all know this, but it doesn't help that they don't have the power or ability to solve the underlying problem.
p.s. Are they going to shorten the CA certificate lifetimes as well? What about the DNSSEC root key lifetimes?
hoping this is only external certs
I've been self CA signing internal certs for 800 days for at least 5 years(prior to that it was for 10 years at a time), never had a complaint that a browser didn't like it(assuming they installed the CA to trust). Probably 95% of my certs are like that, only a few externally signed. No fancy automation (too many different kinds of systems and processes) other than decent alerting to know when they expire.
Overall seems pretty pointless to me. History shows that attackers maintain access to networks and systems for extended periods (months) on average so they can just grab the newer certs as they get installed.
Not sure about the quantum angle that makes no sense. The cert is about identification not about securing data transmission.
Why not...
Multipart certificates? Like a carnet? Buy 12 at a time, install 12 at a time. Serve one at a time.